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How banks determine their own “cost of compliance”

How banks determine their own “cost of compliance”

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By:
Simone Martin
November 20, 2026
10 min
November 20, 2026
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This is some text inside of a div block.

Banks say they can't measure what compliance costs, but a fine may have just supplied the answer. When a penalty amounts to less than 1% of profits, the question is whether anti-money laundering rules are being enforced or simply priced in.

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Key insights:

  • Fines are small next to profits — Bank of America's $1.2 billion penalty is about 0.63% of its estimated net profits for the period. At that scale, enforcement looks like a business expense.
  • Warnings changed little — A 2024 cease-and-desist order didn't stop years of oversight failures at BofA. That raises the question of whether fines alone can change behavior.
  • Leaders escape accountability — Executives often keep their bonuses. The fix is to take back profits and disqualify directors and managers from serving on public companies.

If you’ve sought out the metrics for the cost of compliance for banks, you’d be hard-pressed to find it. Run the numbers — the cost of compliance staff, required systems, their implementation, and the add-ons impacted by each jurisdiction’s supervisory approach to anti-money laundering (AML) compliance. The result should roughly equal the cost of compliance.

However, that formula may apply to everyone except banks, which, it seems, determine their own cost of compliance.

Over the past five years, more than 20 separate banking institutions around the world have been fined $10 million or more for AML compliance failures. Of that group, six had fines of more than US$500 million, with standouts being TD Bank (with approximately $3 billion imposed) and Danske Bank (approximately $2.05 billion).

Failures in AML compliance pop up in the news, compliance professionals post about it, and then the world keeps spinning. Most recently, Bank of America (BofA) was fined $1.2 billion dollars by United States regulators. Their AML compliance failures include:

  • failure to mitigate and report priority national security risks, including Chinese money laundering networks and illicit finance along the southwest border;
  • deficient and ineffective Bank Secrecy Act and AML compliance programs; and
  • an $11.6 million settlement agreement with BofA over apparent violations of numerous sanctions programs, including those on Iran, Russia, narcotics, and global terrorism.

This didn’t just start from recent regulatory reviews. BofA had a cease and desist order issued in December 2024 requiring them to address their “deficient and ineffective” AML compliance program. The U.S. Treasury’s press release also stated that, BofA’s “transaction monitoring system resulted in the Bank failing to properly monitor trillions of dollars in transactions. This caused large numbers of late SARs [Suspicious Activity Reports] involving billions of dollars.”

The cost of compliance is exactly that — the cost of regulatory enforcement and the AML fines paid. It’s not the investment into the compliance program.

Of course, with a case resulting in such a significant fine, there will be more in the mortar than the pestle. For example, Treasury’s Consent Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty outlined a timeline of bad behavior by BofA, stating: “The conduct described below took place from at least January 1, 2018 through July 1, 2025 (the Relevant Time Period)…” and “Bank of America failed to implement and maintain an AML program that met several of the BSA’s requirements during the Relevant Time Period.” Interesting. A quick query online finds that Bank of America made total profits during the relevant time period of roughly $190 billion.

That means, Bank of America can now identify its cost of compliance. Using the AML fine issued for the relevant time period as $1.2 billion, you get 0.63% of aggregate net profit for the relevant time period. Ironically, the fine seems substantial until — not unlike AML compliance in practice — you take the risks in context.

When I was a regulator, I felt that if you wanted to look at the cost of compliance, then look at fines levied by regulators on several large financial institutions in the past few years. In retrospect, I didn’t appreciate how right I was.

The cost of compliance is exactly that — the cost of regulatory enforcement and the AML fines paid. It’s not the investment into the compliance program. It’s not the reinforcement of a compliance culture that empowers compliance officers. It’s not even the many solutions that exist by leveraging advanced technologies for better transaction monitoring, SARs filing, and more.

The cost of compliance is the fines paid — and that’s only after regulators catch the bank after years of compliance window-dressing.

Governance determines the culture… and costs

In fining financial institutions for noncompliance, and particularly, in occurrences of fraud, money laundering, and sanctions evasion, CEOs and board directors often escape any penalties. In the case brought against Wells Fargo in 2016, the CEO, John Stumpfs, sat before the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, with an attitude I remember as defensive and irritated. Yet, Stumpfs was forced to retire and forfeit substantial bonuses; then, following his retirement, four more of Wells Fargo’s directors resigned, including the executive chairman of the board, in the face of shareholder demands for a change in board oversight. However, these actions were largely driven by shareholder activism, not regulatory intervention.

In the regulatory post-mortems for many other banks, there have been numerous instances in which the CEOs, directors, and other managers made sure that compliance departments didn’t hinder business while short-circuiting compliance to maintain large profit margins. But guess what? Those leaders got fat bonuses for keeping the banks profitable while compliance was left with scraps to survive on.

Today, unsurprisingly, money continues to be a powerful incentive. Regulators that don’t factor in the incentive into their supervisory and enforcement calculus will continue to fail at making real change!

Indeed, the purpose of compliance is not to stop institutions from making money, although there are those who may argue that it does. Compliance is in all things. Aviation compliance requirements don’t stop airlines from flying — at least until the airlines fail to comply — and I think we’d all want it that way for aviation. The same should apply in financial services and banking, which are required for stable global economic trade.

We see the impact of poorly calibrated compliance requirements more often in banks than other sectors because of that global engagement. While we shouldn’t use a sledgehammer for every infraction, persistent and seemingly cavalier treatment of AML compliance requires enforcement actions that are calibrated accordingly.

Breaking bad behavior

One thing that could help is that regulatory authorities revisit their enforcement powers to truly break bad behavior, especially in the face of more nuanced assessments from the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The call for effectiveness in AML compliance will excise a lot of failings on all sides as it relates to applied compliance.

What about banks that have findings of poor AML compliance and had been issued remediation actions but continue for years with bad behavior? Regulators should kill the non-compliance with a double-tap of disgorgement (taking a percentage of profits for the so-called relevant period; and in the case of BofA, that’s seven and a half years) and disqualification (banning directors and managers who were found to be willfully negligent or otherwise complicit in undermining effective compliance).

Remember, the purpose of enforcement action is to modify behavior towards greater compliance, and that applies in every regulated environment. If a cease-and-desist order didn’t modify the behavior of BofA, I’m not convinced that a penalty of 0.6% of aggregate net (not gross) income will.

Until I see otherwise, the cost of compliance for firms is a simple bit of mathematics in which the cost of Compliance simply equals the AML compliance fines imposed. It’s not the cost affixed to the compliance staff, systems, and supervision — those are merely a rounding error.

You can find out more about the challenges faced by corporate compliance professionals here

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How banks determine their own “cost of compliance”
Banks say they can't measure what compliance costs, but a fine may have just supplied the answer. When a penalty amounts to less than 1% of profits, the question is whether anti-money laundering rules are being enforced or simply priced in.
November 20, 2026
10 min
Corporate Compliance & Risk
Simone Martin
Author and former Regulatory Industry official
Headshot of Simone Martin
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